CPLR 3101: Court Recognizes That Public Policy Grounds for Restricting Disclosure in Matrimonial Actions Are No Longer Viable by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 45 
Number 3 Volume 45, March 1971, Number 3 Article 19 
December 2012 
CPLR 3101: Court Recognizes That Public Policy Grounds for 
Restricting Disclosure in Matrimonial Actions Are No Longer 
Viable 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1971) "CPLR 3101: Court Recognizes That Public Policy Grounds for Restricting 
Disclosure in Matrimonial Actions Are No Longer Viable," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 45 : No. 3 , Article 
19. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss3/19 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
is past. We can no longer afford the time or judicial manpower for the
repeated applications for the same relief which necessarily result from
postponing decision."98
There would seem to be nothing to preclude the East Asiatic
decision. The time-honored rule of non-inquiry into the merits of a
3025(b) motion to amend is derived strictly from the case law of the
various departments of the appellate division.99 Lacking any instruction
to the contrary from the Court of Appeals, the discretion available to
the court under rule 3025(b) would appear to be broad enough to
include an inquiry into the merits.
ARTiCLE 31 - DIsCLOSUR
CPLR 3101: Court recognizes that public policy grounds for restrict-
ing disclosure in matrimonial action are no longer viable.
It had long been ruled that disclosure in matrimonial actions
should be limited to cases wherein the movant demonstrated "special
circumstances."' 100 For, disclosure was deemed to be burdensome and
it was feared that discovery proceedings would jeopardize the parties'
chances for a reconciliation.101 With the enactment of the DRL, how-
ever, and its provision for extensive conciliation proceedings, 10 2 it was
posited that the public policy grounds for restricting the use of dis-
closure devices in matrimonial actions were no longer viable' 03 This
approach was adopted by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
in Dunlap v. Dunlap.1°4
In Dunlap plaintiff-wife sought to examine defendant on two
claims: her cause of action for divorce based on the nonfault ground of
living apart for a period of two years pursuant to a separation agree-
ment and defendant's counterclaim based on adultery. Recognizing
that the grounds for denying disclosure have been "substantially
diminished," the court permitted plaintiff to examine defendant re-
garding her action for divorce. However, the court properly disallowed
98 Id. at 434, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
99 See note 96 infra.
100 Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1960); Ken-
nedy v. Kennedy, 40 Misc. 2d 672, 243 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).
101 See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't
1959); see also CARMODY-FARKOSCH, NEw Yomt PRacrxic 575-76 (8th ed. 1963).
102 DRL § 215(c) et seq.
103 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 15, at 18-20 (1970).
104 34 App. Div. 2d 889, 312 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1970); see also Hochberg v. Hoch-
berg, 63 Misc. 2d 77, 310 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 342, 356 (1970).
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inquiry into the husband's counterclaim inasmuch as he was not com-
petent to testify on that issue.105
Dunlap represents a marked shift in judicial attitude toward dis-
closure in matrimonial actions. Formerly, a demonstration of special
circumstances was required in order to obtain disclosure; now, dis-
closure can be foreclosed only by an avowal of special circumstances.
Such a construction is in accord with the general approach to disclosure
under the CPLR1 6 and is laudably responsive to the Court of Appeals
interpretation of article 31.107
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Satisfaction of section 17 of Court of Claims Act
automatically satisfies "special circumstances" requirement.
In General Building Supply Corp. v. State0 8 claimant sought leave
to examine the state's consultant engineer with regard to flooding on a
certain highway project. In support of its motion,10 9 claimant averred
that the examination was material and necessary to the proper prepara-
tion for trial within the meaning of section 17 of the Court of Claims
Act." 0 For, the engineer was the only person in charge of the project
who had personal knowledge of events underlying its claim. Thus,
claimant contended that adequate "special circumstances" as prescribed
under CPLR 3101 justified the examination of the non-party witness.
In granting the motion to examine, the Court of Claims was heavily
influenced by the admission of the state's own engineer at an earlier
examination that he had no personal knowledge of the facts in issue
since on the two crucial dates involved the consultant engineer had been
in charge of the operations. Pointing out that the phrase "material and
necessary" has been equated with a test of usefulness and reason,"' the
court agreed with the observation put forth by one authority that "[i]f
a witness holds ... a key, to any substantial fact involved in the case,
how can any lawyer... be compelled to go to trial without knowing
105 CPLR 4502.
106 Under article 31, the parties are entitled, in most instances, to proceed without
prior court approval. It is only when a party believes that his adversary is abusing his
right to disclosure that a court takes cognizance of the proceedings under CPLR 3103's
provision for a protective order.
107See Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
108 63 Misc. 2d 520, 312 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Ct. Claims 1970).
109 Disclosure by the state is governed by the same rules applicable to private parties
"except that it may be obtained only by order of the court in which the action is pending
and except further that it may not include interrogatories or requests for admissions,"
CPLR 3102(f). See generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3102, commentary 10, at 269-71 (1967).
110 N.Y. Or. CLAiMs Aar § 17 (McKinney 1963).
111 Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1968).
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